From orbit to operations: Why space is central to the administration and critical infrastructure

During my time at the Cybersecurity and Infrastructure Security Agency (CISA), we worked on the National Security Memorandum on Critical Infrastructure Security and Resilience (NSM-22) which was published on April 30, 2024.  

While we were developing this NSM, we went through a process of deliberating the 16 critical infrastructure sectors that existed at the time. Were these sectors still relevant? What changes, if any, needed to be made to the sectors?

One of the heavily debated possible additions to the sector structure was space, as space assets and equities cut widely across different parts of the 16 critical infrastructure sectors.

The label doesn't matter, but priority does: The space superiority directive

NSM-22 was published without any changes to the sectors, but the debate has not subsided. Whether or not space is designated as a critical-infrastructure sector, the current administration is treating space as a national priority across civil, commercial, and defense lines, an approach that will shape both defense and civilian critical infrastructure for years.

Echoing the importance of space, the administration issued a sweeping Executive Order titled "Ensuring American Space Superiority," on Dec. 18, the same day Jared Isaacman was sworn in as the 15th NASA Administrator,

The Executive Order lays out four priorities of what the government expects to build, buy, regulate, and defend. It directs:

Implementation details matter as much as ambition. The order assigns overall coordination to the Assistant to the President for Science and Technology, calls for agencies to streamline procurement with a first preference for commercial solutions, and directs acquisition reforms intended to lower barriers for new market entrants.

It also revises Space Policy Directive 3 on space traffic management so that civil space situational awareness services are "available for commercial and other relevant use," signaling a shift toward more formal commercial service provision and higher expectations for data sharing, standards, and operator participation.

Policy follows scale

The Space Foundation estimates the global space economy reached $613 billion in 2025, with commercial activity comprising the majority of that total. Launch cadence continues to significantly rise as well, as launch costs have decreased 90% over the last 20 years.

The first half of 2025 saw over 1,200 satellites launched (with 573 of them being SpaceX Starlink satellites) in a record-breaking 317 rocket launches worldwide in 2025, roughly one launch to orbit every 28 hours. Those figures translate into more satellites, more services, and more dependencies that reach far beyond the aerospace ecosystem.

If you interact with infrastructure, you're already a space customer

Those dependencies show up in places that feel very terrestrial. Nearly every critical industry and service across the 16 U.S. critical infrastructure sectors relies on space-enabled capabilities.

Space-based weather data feeds aviation routing, wildfire forecasting, and disaster response planning. Positioning, navigation, and timing signals underpin daily commutes, precision agriculture, maritime navigation, and the time synchronization that supports financial markets and power grid operations.

If you are an infrastructure operator, or simply a civilian using daily-life infrastructure services, you are already a space customer whether you think about it or not.

A contested space domain means infrastructure is at risk

As systems that underpin daily life and essential services increasingly depend on space, its criticality also increases. With that criticality, however, space becomes increasingly contested and has already become a designated warfighting domain.

The success of any modern military is highly dependent on space capabilities and space communication infrastructure. Public reporting has described the United States and China maneuvering satellites in close proximity, sometimes characterized as "dogfighting" in orbit as each side tries to inspect and understand the other's systems. Russian satellites have likely on many occasions followed USG/NRO satellites and potentially threatened them with kinetic weapons.

Counterspace options range from jamming and spoofing to cyber operations and physical interference. As such, modern satellites and space superiority incessantly hinges on the maneuverability and dynamism of space operations. For the U.S. to maintain its space superiority, static orbits will no longer cut it.

All of this is deeply interconnected with civilian critical infrastructure. Commercial operators increasingly sit on the front line, with systems deeply integrated into national security missions and essential civilian services. This blurs the line between legitimate military targets and civilian critical infrastructure targets whose compromise could affect millions of people.

Navigation systems are where this risk is poised to be most critical and disruptive. The civilian "cascading impact" is easily visualized in a broadband incident that took place just prior to Russia's invasion of Ukraine: a cyberattack attributed to Russia disrupted Ukraine's military command-and-control communications by targeting Viasat's satellite networks, cutting broadband internet access to about 40,000 subscribers in Europe.

While this was a military maneuver by Russia to impact Ukraine's military, there was collateral civilian-infrastructure damage to countries beyond Russia and Ukraine, demonstrating how an action intended to degrade military communications can also hit civilian connectivity and essential services beyond the battlefield. It provided an early warning that space-enabled services are a prime target at the beginning of a conflict.

Critical-infrastructure resilience is orbital

Even if disruption is limited or avoided, the strategic lesson is the same: In cyber campaigns, and in any future crisis or conflict, adversaries will almost immediately challenge in-orbit infrastructure. The ripple effects will land on defense operations, emergency response, aviation and maritime safety, and the civilian infrastructure that depends on resilient connectivity.

As defenders of critical infrastructure embedded in the daily lives of all people, we cannot let that happen. Making space systems resilient means making critical infrastructure resilient.