COMMENTARY: China is testing more than weapons. It is testing America’s ability to protect its defense supply chains and the networks that keep our homeland defense mission connected. As the Pentagon advances the
Golden Dome for America (GDA) initiative, the most ambitious missile defense and command and control program in decades, one truth must be confronted directly. Without secure supply lines and trusted communications, the entire effort is vulnerable before it even begins.
Recent Chinese actions make that risk unmistakable. In October, Beijing’s Ministry of Commerce
announced new export controls on rare earths and associated technologies, including the metals and magnet materials that power missile guidance, satellite communications, and advanced semiconductors. Under this rule, any product anywhere in the world containing more than 0.1% Chinese-origin rare earth content now requires approval from the Chinese government before export. A U.S. or allied manufacturer producing critical defense components could suddenly find itself dependent on a license from Beijing to ship its own product.
China is using its dominance over rare earth supply chains as a strategic weapon, just as it is testing cyber and space capabilities intended to blind and confuse U.S. systems. The Golden Dome program cannot afford to ignore this reality.
The Supply Chain Threat
Every major missile, satellite, and radar system the United States operates depends on rare earth materials and precision magnets. China currently
controls around 70% of global rare earth mining and 90% of magnet production. The new export regime, formally listed under PRC Ministry of Commerce (MOFCOM)
Announcement 61, expands those controls downstream to cover entire technology sectors. It captures semiconductors, unmanned systems, and missile guidance components that rely on magnets containing dysprosium, terbium, and samarium.
Beginning December 1, any company exporting an end product that includes those materials must apply for a license from Beijing. The regulation explicitly prohibits approval for shipments tied to military or dual-use applications. In effect, China has given itself a veto over critical components that sustain U.S. and allied defense programs.
These same materials are used in the sensors and power systems that will enable GDA’s interceptors and radar networks. Unless the United States hardens its industrial base, Beijing could strangle the supply of parts required to defend the homeland and our allies against future missile threats.
The U.S. government should expand
Defense Production Act authorities, accelerate public-private partnerships in magnet manufacturing, and deepen cooperation with partners like Australia and Japan, both already increasing their mining and refining capacity. The Department of Defense’s investments in MP Materials and Lynas are positive steps. But GDA demands more than incremental capacity. It requires a sustainable, secure supply chain beyond the reach of foreign interference.
The Command Network Challenge
Just as China seeks to weaponize supply chains, it also aims to disrupt how America commands and controls its defenses. GDA’s command and control infrastructure must be capable of surviving in a contested environment where communications will be targeted from the opening moments of conflict.
Rather than invent new, unproven networks, the United States should rely on those already hardened and trusted within the national security community, beginning with the
Joint Worldwide Intelligence Communications System (JWICS).JWICS serves as the classified communications backbone for the Intelligence Community and the Department of Defense. It connects hundreds of thousands of users across government agencies through secure, encrypted, air-gapped links. It has been tested in real-world operations, providing daily top-secret connectivity and coordination across global missions.
Expanding JWICS to function as the core command and control network for GDA makes strategic and operational sense. The infrastructure exists. The user base is trusted. The security architecture is proven. Leveraging JWICS for GDA would allow homeland defense operators, intelligence analysts, and decision-makers to share threat data and engagement orders in real time without the risk and delay of transitioning between unvetted or vendor-managed systems.
This approach aligns with the Pentagon’s
Joint All-Domain Command and Control (JADC2) strategy, which calls for seamless data integration across every domain on a unified, resilient network. JWICS already embodies that concept. Scaling it for the GDA effort would not only reduce cost and risk but deliver deterrence through trusted communication.
Policy Action: Resilience as a National Imperative
To make GDA a reality, the United States must institutionalize resilience as a national policy. That begins with three immediate actions.
First, secure critical materials. Rare earths, magnets, and semiconductor inputs must be treated as strategic resources. Domestic production should be funded and allied capacity incentivized before China can use supply as coercion.
Second, modernize JWICS. Support the Defense Intelligence Agency’s
modernization initiative to extend JWICS for command and control missions. Build redundancy at combatant commands and standardize joint operational protocols specific to Golden Dome.
Third, mandate transparency. Require every GDA contractor to deliver complete hardware and software bills of materials. Full visibility into component origins is the only way to identify dependencies on adversarial suppliers and eliminate hidden vulnerabilities.
The Stakes
GDA is more than a missile shield. It is a test of whether the United States can design, build, and protect complex systems in a world defined by supply chain warfare and digital conflict. The hardware will be built in factories, launched from silos, and guided by satellites, but the true contest will play out across industrial and cyber domains long before the first interceptor fires.
China’s strategy assumes that the United States will be too dependent or too slow to adapt. GDA must prove that assumption wrong. Executed with discipline, this initiative can become the model for integrated deterrence through secure supply, trusted command, and allied resilience working together as one.
This approach is about preparation. The next time an adversary tests America’s resolve, whether in orbit, cyberspace, or the industrial base, there must be no weak link to exploit. The Golden Dome will be only as strong as the systems beneath it. Strengthening those systems now is how we ensure deterrence tomorrow. Resilience is not just a defensive measure; it is America’s most powerful signal of resolve.
